The Presidency:

- There is no question but that OSTP is a useful office in the EOP and helpful to the President.

- But its role in this administration, even in the last two, and that of PCAST is far from what the Carnegie Report envisioned or recommended. It is marginal on major issues of national policy, especially security (perhaps homeland security is an exception, at least until the new department is formed) and now energy, though I believe it continues to have some influence on space policy. Even on global issues, which would seem to be a natural fit, it no longer seems to have a significant role.

- OSTP does appear to have an important role on issues closely related to science and technology policy, such as budgets, secrecy, and general university-related issues. I know much less about what PCAST, now heavily dominated by industrial members, is actually engaged in.

- The Science Adviser has, apparently voluntarily, given up two of his legislatively-mandated Associate Directors and has allowed the whole office, except for one suite in the OEOB, to move out of the White House and EOB complex. Anyone who knows about White House politics understands well the significance of geography.

- This President and the last seem to be only peripherally interested in s&t; Clinton because he turned the subject largely over to his V.P., Bush I refrain from speculating about causes. The first Bush Presidency was more directly engaged in s&t-related issues, but even there his science adviser had little to do with many major issues such as national security.

- In general, though I recognize the risk of unwarranted extrapolation from current experience, I perceive a rather steady decline in the fortunes and influence (in terms of the Carnegie Commission’s standards) of the Science Adviser and OSTP. Is this approaching what is likely to be the norm, or are we just as likely to see a return to interest in the office by a future President? I am inclined to think this will much more probably be the norm.

- If so, or even if it is not certain, I believe some thought ought to be given to what might be recommended if the current situation remains in the future approximately as it is today. (There are many reasons why I believe the current situation has developed as it has and is unlikely to change, but that is for a longer discussion.)

- Some of the functions that can be expected of OSTP and the Science Adviser unless there is a complete change of fortunes:

- science policy (budgets, rules governing funding, shortfalls, patents policy, etc.)
- early warning of serious dangers, policy difficulties, e.g. stem cells
- dealing with cross-agency issues of significance
- establishing standards for science and technology throughout gov’t
- actively promoting scientific competence in non-science agencies, e.g. State
- special studies undertaken when non-agency views necessary, e.g. energy

- To be clear, I agree with the Carnegie Commission on what the roles of OSTP “should” be, but I believe that time may now be passed. OSTP ought to have a major role on security issues, but DOD and NSC will no longer “allow” it. Its apparent loss of influence on global issues such as the environment I don’t understand, but leadership appears to have passed to other agencies. S&t budgets remain, at least because OMB sees the great value to it of OSTP being a substantial player. If the OMB/OSTP relationship doesn’t flourish, I would worry even about that.

- Issues of the effects of secrecy on the health of science ought to be a central issue for OSTP, and it is certainly involved. On the other hand, it did not seem to have much clout on the more than two years of negotiations within the government on amendments to the ITAR (International Trade in Arms Regulations) in which State and DOD, especially the latter, had much more to say. And, the result raised as many questions and difficulties as it eased.

- Perhaps what Carnegie should now be emphasizing at the level of the Presidency is the importance of building s&t competence throughout the EOP, especially in NSC, OMB, and Homeland Security. That may be a more productive direction than believing that OSTP and the Science Adviser can be resurrected to what they once were.

State Department:
- The situation in State is not totally different from the EOP, but in this case is much better than it was a few years ago. The creation of the post of Science Adviser to the Secretary after the NAS report is a substantial step forward. Norman Neureiter, who has been filling the post on a limited assignment (originally supposed to be 3-years but in fact only for 18 months at the start, extended for an additional 12, with the final 6 months not certain) has been doing a superb job from what I can see, and has demonstrated the value of the position to many in the department.

- However, again it is quite far from what the Carnegie Commission hoped. In this case, I believe the Commission’s recommendation about a science adviser was unrealistic at the time, and if it were not for Madeline Albright’s particular interest, would have been unrealistic with regard to this recommendation of the NAS.

- In fact, the Adviser, regardless of title, rarely sees the Secretary (though Powell loses no opportunity to praise Neureiter) and is not included in the daily staff meetings for the Secretary.

- Neureiter is actively carrying out one of the key mandates of both the NAS and Commission reports, which is to spread the influence and knowledge of s&t, and of his office, throughout the Department. He has been enormously aided in this by the response of the scientific community that has come forward with much help, in particular by expanding the number of science fellowships available for placement in the Department.

- Still, my sense of it is that the post and its potential role are poorly understood and not fully supported. The management gurus are right now challenging the existence of the office at the Undersecretary level (recommended by the NAS and agreed to by Albright), suggesting that it more appropriately ought to be a staff office within the OES Bureau (Oceans, Environment and International Scientific Affairs). Since power and influence within State is concentrated in the geographical bureaus, such a move down to a functional bureau, and one without much prestige at that, would be a death knell. I suspect it won’t happen, but that is the nature of the discussion.

- In addition, the level of the post (a political appointment but for a fixed term) is a notch below what it ought to be, and is one reason (there were others) no senior scientist with much visibility would consider the job. In my view, a prestigious scientist, even if one could have been attracted, would not have done as good a job as Neureiter has in working the bureaucracy at all levels throughout the Department.

- Nevertheless, I believe it is fair to say that the science adviser and his office has in general less to do with major s&t-related foreign policy issues at the Secretary’s level as the Commission and the NAS had hoped.

- As with the White House, should this be taken as the norm, or as something that can be seen as a bridgehead that will allow building to a more effective situation in the future? The answer isn’t yet certain, but I am inclined to think that it is more likely the norm, and one that will require real effort even to maintain. All Secretaries and FSOs agree that s&t are changing their world, but they do not see a Science Adviser and a limited office as the answer to their needs, or often even relevant.

- In this case–the State Dept.–I personally believe it is essential to maintain the office at the USG level, not so much for advice to the Secretary and his five Undersecretaries, but because that is essential for other purposes:

- to develop programs to meet the long-term essential need of infusing the Foreign Service with sense of s&t and how to deal with s&t-related issues as part of normal career requirements

- to provide a viable and innovative connection with the s&t communities outside government to encourage their involvement in formulating foreign policy

- to provide a knowledgeable link with the technical agencies and departments of government on their extensive foreign programs

- to provide a receptive (and non-threatening) home for requests from other parts of the Department for help on specific issues

- to create a presence at senior levels that is ready to provide help and information when needed

- Thus, for the Department of State, I believe it is critical to maintain the somewhat shaky existence of the post with the title of Adviser to the Secretary. If it also provides advice to the Secretary and the senior officers, so much the better, but it has many other critical roles to play. Perhaps the most important is to help evolve the culture of the Department so that FSOs have the training and preparation to understand how s&t relate to their primary policy responsibilities, how to anticipate issues or deal with them as they arise, and how to obtain help when they need it.