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Comments on Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government
For Submission to Jesse H. Ausubel, Rockefeller University
M.R.C. Greenwood
As requested by Jesse H. Ausubel, these comments have been prepared
for consideration at a meeting on November 7-8, 2002 that has been planned
to undertake (1) a retrospective look at the work accomplished under the
auspices of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government
(1988-1993), and (2) a prospective view of potential challenges facing
society over the next ten years.
Retrospective Look
- There is no doubt that, taken as a whole, the work and
publications of the Commission constitute a major highlight in a long
series of similar examinations of science and technology policy and
organizational issues dating back to the Allison Commission of the 1880s.
Indeed, many of the themes and issues addressed by the Allison Commission
(under the umbrella of the National Academy of Sciences) were likewise
addressed by the Carnegie Commission: optimal organization for the
performance of science and technology, foundations and priorities for
society's support of science, and the relationships between science and
government.
- Another comparable series of studies on many of these same
issues
was aimed at setting the directions and institution-building for science,
technology and government in the post-war world: some within the Congress
(Harley Kilgore and Warren Magnuson) and some in the science world
(Vanevar Bush: The Endless Frontier). Results were establishment of the
AEC, NIH, and NSF.
- These efforts were followed by congressional studies
(1950s and
1960s) under the leadership of Rep. Carl Elliot (Elliot Report) and later
Senator Henry Jackson as well as Rep. Emilio Daddario (multi-year series
of hearings and studies that led to the reorganization of Congress for
science and to the establishment of NASA, EPA, ERDA as well as the
National Science and Technology Policy Act of 1976 and establishment of
OSTP.)
- Retrospectively, it is not as easy or simple to trace
specific
outcomes from the work of the Carnegie Commission as it is for some of the
other cited endeavors. The Carnegie outputs are far more diffused in
their impact and have permeated main stream thinking in far more subtle
ways than the specific organizational outcomes of earlier works noted
above.
- The difficulty in tracing such impacts is closely related
to a
structural flaw in not only the Carnegie Commission but also most other
Commissions: the absence of a formal, follow-up process to analyze
systematically over time the nature and degree of the impact of
Commission's analyses and recommendations. This comment leads to a
recommendation for the performance of any subsequent venture along the
lines of the original Carnegie Commission: Funding and organizational
measures should be established to permit long-term longitudinal and
multi-dimensional studies of the Commission's work and recommendations.
Prospective Look
- A first comment in the prospective category is that a follow-on
effort definitely should be undertaken. There is literally no evidence
that within the Congress or the Administration is there any inclination or
capability to undertake the kinds of major policy/future-oriented studies
comparable to the work of the 1940s-1960s. Further, there seems to be no
significant action underway, other than specific, narrow-individual
research based studies, being supported by the foundation world or by
government.
- Within the past ten years, the world has changed
dramatically; but
even that word may be an understatement. It may be more accurate to
suggest that changes are underway in ways and degree that are previously
unseen.
- The only recent major Commission that has addressed some
of these
changes even partially is the Hart-Rudman Commission (formally known as
the United States Commission on National security/21st Century). Until
9/11, its work had disappeared with barely a trace; only that terrible
event led the White House to reach out in desperation for the concept of a
Homeland Security Agency.
- A basic planning principle of any subsequent follow-on
Commission
should be to sharply narrow the field of study. The original Commission
covered in a highly laudable manner, during its five years, virtually the
entire landscape of science, technology and government. This had a major
advantage by establishing benchmarks in many areas that had not previously
been examined. On the other hand, the scope was so broad as to be nearly
overwhelming to policy makers faced with an array of urgent problems.
- It will not be presumed in this short piece to suggest a
detailed
agenda for a follow-on Commission, but at the very least the following
might be candidates:
- Implications of the new relationship between national security and
homeland security for science and technology.
- An examination of the process and reasons for the
"downgrading" of
science and technology policy in the upper levels of the Administration-a
reversal of nearly a half-century of moving in the opposite direction.
- In response to the changes underway, what institutional
changes
might be considered within the legislative and executive branches. The
present framework is nearly fifty years old and historically we have made
changes more frequently in the past-as times and circumstances have
changed.
- A detailed review of the 50 recommendations presented in
the
Hart-Rudman Commission reports: An over-arching recommendation of special
relevance is the argument of the Commission that in seeking a more
broadly-based concept of national security, it is necessary "to go beyond
traditional, narrowly defined military and intelligence areas by including
economics, science and technology, and education for a new age in which
novel opportunities and challenges coexist uncertainly with familiar
ones."
- Despite the end of the Cold War, America faces distinctly
new
dangers, particularly to the homeland and to our scientific and
educational base. These new dangers must be addressed; we are in
uncharted territory.
- The importance of designing a new national human resource
policy
to improve the participation of U.S. citizens in science and technology
graduate and professional programs. Consider a new version of the
post-Sputnick national defense education programs under a new national
service rubric.
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Posted 10.31.02
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