Invitee Comments: M.R.C. Greenwood 
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Comments on Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government For Submission to Jesse H. Ausubel, Rockefeller University M.R.C. Greenwood

As requested by Jesse H. Ausubel, these comments have been prepared for consideration at a meeting on November 7-8, 2002 that has been planned to undertake (1) a retrospective look at the work accomplished under the auspices of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government (1988-1993), and (2) a prospective view of potential challenges facing society over the next ten years.

Retrospective Look
  1. There is no doubt that, taken as a whole, the work and publications of the Commission constitute a major highlight in a long series of similar examinations of science and technology policy and organizational issues dating back to the Allison Commission of the 1880s. Indeed, many of the themes and issues addressed by the Allison Commission (under the umbrella of the National Academy of Sciences) were likewise addressed by the Carnegie Commission: optimal organization for the performance of science and technology, foundations and priorities for society's support of science, and the relationships between science and government.

  2. Another comparable series of studies on many of these same issues was aimed at setting the directions and institution-building for science, technology and government in the post-war world: some within the Congress (Harley Kilgore and Warren Magnuson) and some in the science world (Vanevar Bush: The Endless Frontier). Results were establishment of the AEC, NIH, and NSF.

  3. These efforts were followed by congressional studies (1950s and 1960s) under the leadership of Rep. Carl Elliot (Elliot Report) and later Senator Henry Jackson as well as Rep. Emilio Daddario (multi-year series of hearings and studies that led to the reorganization of Congress for science and to the establishment of NASA, EPA, ERDA as well as the National Science and Technology Policy Act of 1976 and establishment of OSTP.)

  4. Retrospectively, it is not as easy or simple to trace specific outcomes from the work of the Carnegie Commission as it is for some of the other cited endeavors. The Carnegie outputs are far more diffused in their impact and have permeated main stream thinking in far more subtle ways than the specific organizational outcomes of earlier works noted above.

  5. The difficulty in tracing such impacts is closely related to a structural flaw in not only the Carnegie Commission but also most other Commissions: the absence of a formal, follow-up process to analyze systematically over time the nature and degree of the impact of Commission's analyses and recommendations. This comment leads to a recommendation for the performance of any subsequent venture along the lines of the original Carnegie Commission: Funding and organizational measures should be established to permit long-term longitudinal and multi-dimensional studies of the Commission's work and recommendations.

Prospective Look
  1. A first comment in the prospective category is that a follow-on effort definitely should be undertaken. There is literally no evidence that within the Congress or the Administration is there any inclination or capability to undertake the kinds of major policy/future-oriented studies comparable to the work of the 1940s-1960s. Further, there seems to be no significant action underway, other than specific, narrow-individual research based studies, being supported by the foundation world or by government.

  2. Within the past ten years, the world has changed dramatically; but even that word may be an understatement. It may be more accurate to suggest that changes are underway in ways and degree that are previously unseen.

  3. The only recent major Commission that has addressed some of these changes even partially is the Hart-Rudman Commission (formally known as the United States Commission on National security/21st Century). Until 9/11, its work had disappeared with barely a trace; only that terrible event led the White House to reach out in desperation for the concept of a Homeland Security Agency.

  4. A basic planning principle of any subsequent follow-on Commission should be to sharply narrow the field of study. The original Commission covered in a highly laudable manner, during its five years, virtually the entire landscape of science, technology and government. This had a major advantage by establishing benchmarks in many areas that had not previously been examined. On the other hand, the scope was so broad as to be nearly overwhelming to policy makers faced with an array of urgent problems.

  5. It will not be presumed in this short piece to suggest a detailed agenda for a follow-on Commission, but at the very least the following might be candidates:
    • Implications of the new relationship between national security and homeland security for science and technology.

    • An examination of the process and reasons for the "downgrading" of science and technology policy in the upper levels of the Administration-a reversal of nearly a half-century of moving in the opposite direction.

    • In response to the changes underway, what institutional changes might be considered within the legislative and executive branches. The present framework is nearly fifty years old and historically we have made changes more frequently in the past-as times and circumstances have changed.

    • A detailed review of the 50 recommendations presented in the Hart-Rudman Commission reports: An over-arching recommendation of special relevance is the argument of the Commission that in seeking a more broadly-based concept of national security, it is necessary "to go beyond traditional, narrowly defined military and intelligence areas by including economics, science and technology, and education for a new age in which novel opportunities and challenges coexist uncertainly with familiar ones."

    • Despite the end of the Cold War, America faces distinctly new dangers, particularly to the homeland and to our scientific and educational base. These new dangers must be addressed; we are in uncharted territory.

    • The importance of designing a new national human resource policy to improve the participation of U.S. citizens in science and technology graduate and professional programs. Consider a new version of the post-Sputnick national defense education programs under a new national service rubric.


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Posted 10.31.02